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Opium substitution, reciprocal control and the tensions of geoeconomic integration 
in the China-Myanmar Border 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the past decade, the Chinese state has launched a strategic opium substitution 
program to support agricultural firms in Yunnan province to invest in northern Myanmar, 
which is second only to Afghanistan in drug production. These Yunnanese firms are 
encouraged to collaborate with or hire ex-poppy farmers to plant rubber, sugarcane, tea, 
corn, and other crops so that these farmers can leave the drug economy successfully. This 
paper examines the context and challenges of this program through a framework that 
highlights the tensions between geopolitics and geoeconomics. At one level, the 
framework demonstrates how the geopolitics-geoeconomics relationship is reinforced by 
reciprocal control: the promise of monetary profits has become a strategic tool for the 
Chinese state to implement narcotics control in northern Myanmar. At another level, 
however, reciprocity is manifested unevenly as not all private producers respond to this 
strategy in a positive and engaging manner. This unevenness inevitably generates 
regulatory tensions at multiple scales and underscores, in turn, how border security 
remains intrinsically unstable vis-à-vis attempts at geoeconomic integration.  
 
Keywords: reciprocal control, transnational agribusiness, China, Myanmar, geopolitics, 
geoeconomics, border security 
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Introduction 
 
The notorious illicit opium-producing region of northern Myanmar has become the 
frontline in China’s war on drugs. Sharing a border with China’s Yunnan province, the 
region is endowed with an ideal climate to produce opium poppy, the prime ingredient 
for heroin. Drug trafficking from northern Myanmar into Yunnan is currently perceived 
by the Chinese state as a serious security challenge because around 60 to 70 percent of 
the drugs consumed in China are estimated to come from this region (National Narcotics 
Control Commission (NNCC), 2015). To handle this challenge, the Chinese state 
launched an opium substitution program to encourage and support Yunnan-based 
agricultural firms to invest in northern Myanmar and to collaborate with or hire ex-poppy 
farmers to plant rubber, sugarcane, tea, corn, and other crops. These crops are exported 
into China through a quota system. Instead of a narrow economic policy for capital 
accumulation, transnational agribusiness in the China-Myanmar border involves a 
synthesis of a geopolitical strategy to handle drug-related security challenges and a 
geoeconomic approach to build a China-driven transnational agricultural network from 
which Yunnanese firms can profit. Its emergence reinforces Moisio and Paasi’s (2013: 
261) call to “rethink the often taken-for-granted distinctions between the domestic and 
international or the geopolitical and the geoeconomic.” 
 
This paper analyzes the dynamic state-firm relationships that underpin agribusiness 
in the China-Myanmar border region. Working through the interaction between 
securitization and marketization, it shows how geopolitical security concerns are 
entangled with profit-driven agribusiness. Geopolitically, the Chinese state is confined to 
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its sovereign limits because it cannot unilaterally dispatch law enforcement to northern 
Myanmar to eliminate poppy plantations and prevent drug trafficking (Su, 2015). These 
limits echo Cowen and Smith’s (2009: 31) observation that “national territoriality has 
become the challenge rather than the resolution to insecurity.” To overcome these limits, 
one strategy is to bring firms into the geometry of national security to handle potential 
and existential threats located in foreign territories. Cowen and Smith (2009: 25) construe 
this approach as a geoeconomic strategy through which “geopolitical forms [are] 
recalibrated by market logics.” The most explicit consequence of this recalibration is “the 
proliferation of non-state and private actors entangled in security” (Cowen and Smith, 
2009: 25). For instance, the rise of commercial security by privately organized 
extraterritorial forces such as Blackwater demonstrates the outsourcing of important state 
functions to private firms in the cases of Iraq (Fitzsimmons, 2013; Snukal and Gilbert, 
2015) and Afghanistan (Shannon, 2009). National cybersecurity in the United States and 
United Kingdom is outsourced to privately owned and operated firms, which reinforces 
public-private partnership as the cornerstone of national security strategies (Carr, 2016).  
 
To frame how the Chinese state copes with an economically-oriented form of 
“security initiative,” we draw on Alice Amsden’s (2001) concept of reciprocal control. 
Different from mainstream economists who highlight self-regulating markets and the 
rollback of the state, Amsden (2001) reiterates the importance of selective, careful state 
intervention in the market, particularly for those latecomers who must compete with 
advanced economies. This state intervention includes two aspects: a control mechanism 
to impose discipline on economic behavior, and a principle of reciprocity. As Amsden 
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(1989: 8, original emphasis) argues, “in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, ...the state has 
exercised discipline over subsidy recipients. In exchange for subsidies, the state has 
imposed performance standards on private firms. Subsidies have not been giveaways, but 
instead have been dispensed on the principle of reciprocity.” To achieve reciprocal 
control, states need to wield infrastructural power, or administrative and economic 
capacities, to support and subsidize firms for particular purposes, but also to regulate and 
punish firms for not making good use of state resources or achieving designed goals 
(Amsden, 1989). Although Amsden’s conception provides a useful starting point for 
theorizing the political economy of development, it is restricted to domestic economic 
development in East Asia and inadequately explains how firms react to the state’s 
geoeconomic and security policies.  
 
This paper expands Amsden’s work along three lines of inquiry: firm responses, 
variegated neoliberalization, and security concerns. First, we examine how firms actively 
negotiate their “reciprocity” of state control for their internal benefit rather than operate 
passively within international security frameworks. In and through these dynamic 
responses, the tensions of geoeconomic integration become apparent. Second, we rethink 
reciprocal control as a highly contextualized geoeconomic strategy of neoliberalism in 
the context of East Asia. At first glance, the partnership between the Chinese state and 
firms for opium substitution suggests an expansion of neoliberal governance into the 
terrain of drug control, but the process is actually “predicated on relational geo-
institutional differentiation: tailored to actually existing economic-geographical contexts 
across and beyond Chinese state space” (Lim 2014: 229). Reciprocal control could thus 
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be better understood as integral to and an outcome of variegated neoliberalism: it is not a 
linear-sequential historical process (i.e., a movement from authoritarianism to free market 
capitalism), but a selective adaptation of neoliberal logics to advance broader regulatory 
objectives. Finally, we foreground the intrinsic instability of reciprocal control by 
examining the tensions between the market logic of profit-making by firms and the 
territorial logic of national security. The collective goal of these lines of inquiry is to 
situate Amsden’s focus on reciprocal control within the geopolitics-geoeconomics 
relationship and, in doing so, shed light on the Chinese state’s mobilization of private 
firms to overcome sovereign limits. Through these three objectives, this paper avoids a 
form of static equilibrium between the state and firms in the process of regional 
development, and thus transcends “dichotomous conceptualizations of ‘state-capital’ 
coupling” (Lim, 2012: 713). We argue that reciprocal control underpins the dual process 
of securitization and marketization, with the Chinese state and firms negotiating tensions 
and even conflicts in flexible ways so as to achieve their respective objectives. 
 
This article is structured as follows. The next section conceptualizes reciprocal 
control in relation to the geopolitical and geoeconomic calculations in China. This is 
followed by an analysis of reciprocal policies from the national government in Beijing to 
support the opium substitution program. Section four focuses on two forms of control 
(subsidy regulation and import quota control) deployed by subnational state agencies in 
Yunnan to regulate transnational agribusiness. Reciprocal control emergent at two 
scales—the political and financial support from the central government and the control by 
subnational state agencies—is foregrounded as the key institutional framework to 
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promote and regulate transnational agribusiness in the China-Myanmar border. The 
subsequent section explores the tactics of collaboration and evasion used by Yunnanese 
firms to react to reciprocal control. The importance of examining transnational 
agribusiness as a mixture of market logic and geopolitics is reemphasized in the 
conclusion.  
 
Situating reciprocal control within the geopolitics-geoeconomics relationship 
 
The notion of reciprocal control builds on the “corporatist” developmental model that 
was adapted from other East Asian developmental states. Within such a model, the 
Chinese state increasingly becomes the active mediator and coordinator of intersectoral 
relations, while stepping back from direct intervention (Unger and Chan, 1995; Norris, 
2016). Having said this, the domestic characteristics of the state-firm nexus are 
significantly reconfigured vis-à-vis new geopolitical and geoeconomic engagements 
following China’s growing influence in the process of economic globalization. These 
engagements lead to what Gonzalez-Vicente (2011) terms the internationalization of the 
Chinese state, a process that involves gradual reterritorialization and resolves challenges 
brought by transnational capitalist coalitions and the cultural hegemony of neoliberal 
ideologies (Glassman, 1999). Against this context, reciprocal control is introduced in the 
border regions between China and Myanmar.  
 
The state-firm dynamics of reciprocal control can be better understood through the 
theoretical debate on geopolitics and geoeconomics. In one pioneering study on 
geoeconomics, Luttwak (1990) argues that geoeconomic priorities and modalities have 
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become increasingly influential in state actions in the post-Cold War context when the 
relevance of military threats gradually waned. Geoeconomic engagement with foreign 
forces enters into state politics, partly because economic interest groups seek to 
manipulate the state’s activities on the international scene for their own purposes, and 
partly because the logic of commerce dictated competition in international political 
economy. Hence, Luttwak (1990: 19) argues that states will tend to act geoeconomically 
simply because of what they are: “spatially-defined entities structured to outdo each other 
on the world scene.”  
 
Since then, the tensions between geopolitics and geoeconomics remain an 
important topic. Geoeconomics specifically prioritizes “the accumulation of wealth 
through market control” (Cowen and Smith, 2009: 41). While geoeconomics can be 
understood as a function of capital accumulation, it is simultaneously oriented towards 
noneconomic objectives in the context of international political economy. By 
incorporating market logics within geopolitical calculations, geoeconomics has fostered 
what Cowen and Smith (2009: 40) call “a new disciplining architecture replacing the 
geopolitical mechanisms of colonial administration.” Today, territorial occupation is no 
longer a desired and feasible form of capital accumulation; rather, countries establish 
numerous transnational trade agreements and supranational trading blocs to facilitate the 
accumulation of wealth (Dicken, 2015). Cowen and Smith (2009) further argue that the 
rise of geoeconomics does not necessarily mean the demise of geopolitics or the 
insignificance of national territories. Rather, the strict articulation of national territories 
loses its salience because boundaries blur in order to facilitate the flows of capital and 
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commodities worldwide, while state security along borders and inside territories has been 
sharpened so that the flows of undesired labor power are restricted.  
 
Regarding the transformation of state power in an era of neoliberal capitalism, 
Cowen and Smith (2009: 41) argue that geoeconomic calculation drives the state to 
become “an entrepreneur in its own right, a player in the market first and foremost rather 
than a regulator of the market’s ‘excesses.’” While this argument spells out the key 
characteristics of the state and undoubtedly illuminates the extensions of geoeconomic 
engagement to geopolitical struggles, it remains strikingly abstract and neglects how the 
engagement plays out in place vis-a-vis geopolitical calculations. This neglect represents, 
in turn, a challenge for comprehending Chinese geoeconomic expansion. The Chinese 
state consists of a disaggregated set of actors; underlying what appear to be coherent, 
national-level attempts at geoeconomic integration and geopolitical containment are 
tensions and negotiations amongst these actors (Wedemen, 2003; Lim, 2014). 
Understanding how the geoeconomic expansion of power, defined by Domosh (2013) as 
commercial or economic dominance without direct political control over territory, 
unfolds in the China-Myanmar border region therefore provides an excellent platform to 
evaluate how national-level strategies are affected by local interpretation and 
implementation. 
 
Cross-border agribusiness driven by the opium substitution program is directly 
related to the emergence of a military-state-entrepreneurial complex in northern 
Myanmar aimed at stripping resources and land grabbing (Woods, 2011; Jones, 2014). As 
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Jones (2014) aptly argues, the Burmese armed forces (Tatmadaw in Burmese) coercively 
intervene in the center-peripheral conflict under the guise of safeguarding national unity, 
but attempt to maintain their preferred politicoeconomic order and protect their own 
corporate interests in northern Myanmar. Nevertheless, coercive punishment, forced 
displacement, and land grabs have fuelled popular resentment among ethnic highlanders 
against the Tatmadaw. These seemingly endless military conflicts between local ethnic 
military groups and the Tatmadaw led to territorial fragmentation and economic 
deprivation in northern Myanmar and consequently provided an ideal setting for illegal 
businesses (Su, 2018).  
 
Because these contexts impinge on narcotics control and lie beyond the Chinese 
central government’s territorial control, a geoeconomic strategy was developed and 
introduced in Yunnan to engage with this military-state-entrepreneurial complex and 
reduce the inflows of illicit drugs into China. Here we find that Yunnanese state agencies 
and agricultural firms align with one another around the project of opium substitution in 
northern Myanmar. This alliance is fostered partly because the Yunnan government, 
acting on strategies introduced by Beijing, must rely on agricultural companies to 
overcome its strict territorially-based regulatory limit, or what Agnew (1994) refers to as 
the “territorial trap.” At the same time, these firms also rely on the Chinese state’s 
political and financial support to reduce operation risks in northern Myanmar. Writing 
about the coexistence between geoeconomically active states and private economic 
operators, Luttwak (1990: 22) points out that states might either guide large firms for 
their own geoeconomic interest or provide necessary support for firms’ business 
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operation, giving rise to a relation of “reciprocal manipulation.” This viewpoint is 
suggestive, but might simplify the state-firm relation. A more incisive way to grasp this 
relation is through Amsden’s (2001) concept of reciprocal control.   
 
Specifically, reciprocal control draws on two interrelated strategies: “to make 
manufacturing profitable enough to attract private enterprise[s] through the allocation of 
subsidies and to induce such enterprises to be results-oriented and to redistribute their 
monopoly profits to the population at large” (Amsden, 2001: 125). Amsden (2001: 251) 
further elaborates how state institutions discipline and promote economic activities: 
 
The control mechanism of ‘the rest’ revolved around the principle of 
reciprocity. Subsidies (‘intermediate assets’) were allocated to make 
manufacturing profitable–to facilitate the flow of resources from primary 
product assets to knowledge-based assets–but did not become giveaways. 
Recipients of subsidies were subjected to monitorable performance standards 
that were redistributive in nature and results-oriented.  
 
The value of Amsden’s concept lies in the dynamic emphasis on reciprocity. While state 
authorities offer subsidies and other preferential policies to entice enterprises to invest in 
certain industrial sectors, the state-firm relationship is far from harmonious. Regulatory 
and industrial policies therefore do not lead to uniform and anticipated outcomes. In view 
of these challenges, how do states align corporate strategies and goals to the overarching 
national logic of “development”? Some answers, this paper suggests, could be found in 
the degree of reciprocity amongst firms to geopolitically-motivated policies of the state.  
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Reciprocity via gift-giving is voluntarily made, but as Mauss (1990: 3) observes, 
gifts in reality are often “given and reciprocated obligatorily” (Mauss, 1990: 3). 
Reciprocity thereby alludes to a complex set of social intentional practices for some 
actors to secure something otherwise unavailable to them. As Mauss (1990: 17) 
elaborates, there is a succession of “rights and duties to consume and reciprocate, 
corresponding to rights and duties to offer and accept.” In the context of China’s 
geoeconomic expansion, this point can be turned around: firms receive “gifts” from the 
state and are obliged to reciprocate by fulfilling the state’s economic and social goals. 
This obligation similarly happens in other economies. Drawing on the remaking of the 
labor market in Singapore after the 2007 global financial crisis, for instance, Lim (2012) 
highlights precisely how reciprocity plays out when the Singapore state makes proactive 
efforts to reregulate and reposition the local labor market to meet the demand of 
transnational corporations. Reciprocity juxtaposed with state regulations gives rise to “a 
unique state-firm-labor nexus” that contributes to the capital accumulation dynamic in 
Singapore (Lim, 2012). 
 
Underpinning the analysis are two essential functions that are integral to reciprocal 
control: the direct supply of financial incentives and political support to enterprises 
(reciprocity), and the delicate exercise of regulation and punishment upon enterprises to 
ensure the implementation of political goals (control). Implementing control is therefore 
not merely about gift giving; it involves the efficient organization and mobilization of 
state resources to support and regulate firms. This process is multi-scalar: it involves the 
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configuration of place-specific relations that could embed transnational capital flows. 
Paradoxically, however, the engagement with transnational circulatory capital inevitably 
encourages what Wedeman (2003) terms “strategic disobedience,” a situation where 
loopholes within the expansive regulatory structure could be exploited for firms’ own 
benefit. As the case study on the cross-border region of Yunnan and northern Myanmar 
will show, reciprocal control cannot be generalized as simply a one-dimensional process 
that will kickstart this accumulation dynamic. It also possesses the possibility of a 
counterfunction—one that firms employ to evade state regulations. In a direct 
counterpoint to the objectives of state-led geoeconomic expansion, evasion becomes a 
business strategy—though possibly illegal from the perspective of the state—of firms to 
break down state regulation and thus maximize economic returns. Through this tactic of 
evasion, reciprocal control can be understood less as an abstraction of gift giving and 
receiving, and more like a dynamic process that involves control, resistance, and 
compromise between firms and the state. Exploring this dynamism will shed more light 
into the tensions between geopolitical calculations and geoeconomic integration. The 
extent to which this “strategic disobedience” could disrupt the geopolitical concerns of 
the Chinese state is a direct empirical focus of this paper. 
 
Before proceeding further, we offer a brief note and caveat on data collection. 
Fieldwork was conducted in two border prefectures (Banna and Dehong) in Yunnan from 
May to July, 2016, and in July 2017 (Figure 1). In each prefecture, ten firm managers and 
five government officials were interviewed about the development of transnational 
agribusiness (total number: 30). These officials came from departments such as 
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commerce, public security, customs, and entry-exit inspection. Half of the manager 
respondents were approached through personal networks in Yunnan and the other half 
were introduced by commerce officials in Banna or Dehong. All interviews were 
conducted in Mandarin or Yunnanese dialect.  
 
Informed consent, anonymity, and confidentiality were guaranteed to all 
informants in this research project. Background information on individual participants 
was minimized to further ensure anonymity. Despite these measures, the paper 
recognizes inherent limitations to the validity of first-hand data. It is very hard to directly 
check the validity of the information provided by our respondents during interviews, as 
they refused to share their financial records with us. Furthermore, officials felt reluctant 
to talk about the opium substitution program because the topic is sensitive. For instance, 
one commerce official in Dehong said: “I won’t share any written document with you, 
but I can briefly say something to you. Narcotics control in the border area is a very 
sensitive topic. Foreign media reports defame (literally in Chinese, mohei) what we have 
done in northern Myanmar. It is too bad.” To overcome these limitations and enhance the 
reliability of the data collected, the comments were: (a) cross-referred to identify 
commonalities and contradictions, and (b) juxtaposed with published domestic and 
international media and policy reports.  
 
Reciprocal policies for transnational agribusiness 
 
Because of its isolated location and perfect climate for opium poppy cultivation, northern 
Myanmar became globally infamous for its drug plantations and trafficking. Generally 
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the region refers to two ethnic highland states: Shan state and Kachin state. Drug 
plantations in this region can be traced back to the 1880s when British colonizers initially 
introduced opium seeds from India to what was then Burma, and encouraged the hill 
tribes to plant opium (Chin, 2009). Today it becomes a substantial geographical belt 
where illicit drugs—heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS)—are produced and 
trafficked. Although illicit drugs from northern Myanmar pose serious challenges to 
China’s national security and social stability, the Chinese state’s drug control initiatives 
are confined by two geopolitical limits. First, the Chinese state cannot impose complete 
border control against drug trafficking along the over 1400 kilometer porous borderline 
between Yunnan and northern Myanmar (Figure 1). And second, the Chinese state cannot 
directly wield its coercive force to punish a threatening group of people who live on 
foreign territories. To overcome these geopolitical limits, the Chinese state has worked 
with various institutional forces to launch a strategic opium substitution program to 
support Yunnanese agricultural firms, regardless of whether they are state-owned or 
private, to invest in source areas in northern Myanmar.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
To ensure the effectiveness of the opium substitution program, the Chinese state 
actively works with its counterparts in Myanmar to embark on transnational 
collaboration. In 2007, state representatives from China and Myanmar signed the Action 
Plan for Opium Substitution Program in Naypyitaw, which cleared policy hindrances for 
Yunnanese firms to invest in northern Myanmar. In the signing ceremony, the Chinese 
state representative asserted that:  
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The Chinese state would like to further enhance cooperation with Myanmar in 
the sector of poppy crop substitution and alternative development to gradually 
improve the livelihood of farmers who abandoned poppy cultivation and to 
totally resolve the poppy growing issue that endangers both sides.1 
 
Opium substitution and economic development, to the Chinese state, constituted the key 
to transnational cooperation in the border regions. This view continues to be held jointly 
by antidrug state agencies in China and Myanmar—cross-border development via 
economic cropping in northern Myanmar is necessary for narcotics control.  
 
If transnational cooperation demonstrates the Chinese national government’s 
political support, special reciprocal policies are needed to incentivize Yunnanese firms to 
venture into northern Myanmar. In 2006, the State Council approved the substitution 
program by creating special funds in the Ministry of Finance to disburse as subsidies and 
tax waivers to Yunnanese agricultural firms. Annual funding for the program was 
increased to 250 million yuan (~US$39.5 million) per year in China’s twelfth five-year 
plan for 2011-2015, up from 50 million yuan (~US$7.9 million) previously. The funding 
was redistributed to Yunnan and allocated by Yunnan Department of Commerce and 
local commerce bureaus in border prefectures. So far, around 200 Yunnanese firms have 
participated in the opium substitution program. Over 80 percent of these firms are 
privately owned. According to Guo Shengkun, then State Councilor in charge of national 
security in China, the Chinese state had spent 1.6 billion Chinese yuan (~US$250 
million) in the program by 2016; in the northern parts of Myanmar and Laos, the total 
                                                        
1 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/20/content_7116465.htm 
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size of land for opium substitution reached over 2,300 km2. As Guo asserts, “We will 
continue to promote sustainable alternative development and provide assistance as much 
as we can to help relevant countries.”2 
 
More reciprocal policies were implemented at the subnational scale. For instance, 
in 2004, Yunnan Department of Commerce released the Interim Measures to Promote 
and Regulate the Opium Substitution Program, with specific instruction towards 
investment projects related to agricultural production and farming, alternative 
development via mining and tourism, and infrastructure improvement (road, irrigation, 
and power). Specific policies from these measures include incorporating narcotics control 
into national leaders’ meetings; permitting subnational governments in Yunnan to 
directly handle international affairs related to the program without going through state 
agencies in Beijing; providing more public funding and credit support to agricultural 
enterprises which participate in the program; giving zero-tariff treatment to economic 
crops imported through the program; and simplifying customs procedures for the import 
of economic crops.3 These policies represent the first explicit, albeit somewhat ad hoc, 
acknowledgment of the economic potential of transnational agribusiness between Yunnan 
and northern Myanmar.  
 
The significance of zero-tariff treatment cannot be underestimated. Crop plantation 
is just a first step to reducing narcotics plantation. If crops produced by ex-poppy farmers 
                                                        
2 http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1357307.htm  
3 The full text of the Interim Measures can be found via 
http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/drug/2004-05/26/content_16810645.htm  
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cannot be sold, then their interest in those crops evaporates (Farrell, 1998). Economic 
crops produced in source areas should be sold in extra-local markets so that farmers can 
receive positive cash inflow for improved livelihood. Indeed, for major source areas such 
as northern Myanmar, an extra-local market is often located in foreign countries, partly 
because domestic markets generate weak effective demand for economic crops, and 
partly because military conflicts and ethnic tensions block the smooth flow of 
commodities from source areas to major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay (Chin, 
2009). Laochen, who once led the opium substitution program in Banna, explains the 
plantation-sale procedure: 
 
If we do not purchase back their crops, our job is only half done. We need to 
provide a full-package service. Those ex-poppy farmers cannot open a new 
market [for their crops]. We have to organize companies to purchase these crops 
and sell them [in China]. Then the farmers can receive income and be willing to 
plant crops [instead of opium poppy]. (Interview, July 2016) 
 
This explanation deserves further analysis. First, it verifies the existence of a 
transnational network that involves state agencies and firms in Yunnan, and farmers in 
northern Myanmar to facilitate crossborder agribusiness. While this development 
corresponds with the previously mentioned military-state-entrepreneurial complex as 
identified by Jones (2014) and Woods (2011), this complex has not played a decisive role 
in the China-led opium substitution program. Local military strongmen and 
administrative elites in northern Myanmar’s border area adjacent to Yunnan, either 
appointed by the Burmese central government or affiliated with quasi-autonomous ethnic 
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military groups, reap economic benefit from China’s agricultural investment through tax, 
bribery, protection charge, and carried interest, but they are involved in plantation, sale, 
and distribution.  
 
Second, a market to purchase economic crops produced by ex-poppy farmers is 
extremely important to the long-term initiative in narcotics control. In this sense, the 
opium substitution program is similar to aid programs in Shan and Kachin states 
launched by the Japan International Cooperation Agency and several UN agencies such 
as the World Food Program and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as all of 
them aim for poverty reduction and social development. Nevertheless, China provides a 
market-based solution by opening its domestic agricultural market to crops made in 
northern Myanmar, making the opium substitution program not merely aid for temporary 
relief, but a pathway to economic development. Because of widespread agricultural 
protectionism in the U.S., Japan, and the EU, efforts to promote economic crops from 
source areas in the Andean countries and Afghanistan are deemed to be problematic and 
even failures, as farmers cannot sell their crops to external markets for steady economic 
returns.  
 
Lim (2012) specifies that the articulation of reciprocity is twofold: discursive-
politico commitment and material incentives. The above description of institutional 
arrangement for the opium substitution program reveals how these two aspects play out. 
Geoeconomically, the business in northern Myanmar is a form of what Hofman and Ho 
(2012) call “developmental outsourcing.” In this process, which involves state-facilitated 
offshore incentives for agricultural production and economic development, the state and 
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its agencies, rather than agricultural firms, play a key role in planning and driving 
transnational agribusiness (Hofman and Ho, 2012). Geopolitically, the business enables 
the Chinese state to overcome its sovereign limits and contain the negative influence of 
transnational drug trade. The opium substitution program’s geopolitical significance, 
culminating in a tight collaborative relationship between the Chinese state and firms for 
transnational agribusiness, is revealed by government officials: “Sometimes it is quite 
inconvenient for us to do something in northern Myanmar. So we can request firms to 
help us, regardless of business with local legal authorities or ethnic military groups” (a 
planning official in Dehong); and, “Due to opium substitution, our law enforcement can 
enter into northern Myanmar. If this program did not exist, we could not do so” (a 
security official in Banna).  
 
While these comments appear to represent coherent state action, this paper does 
not construe the Chinese state as monolithic. Rather, tensions between the central 
government in Beijing and local authorities in Yunnan’s border prefectures do exist. As 
the former prioritizes controlling poppy plantation in northern Myanmar and deterring 
drug trafficking in Yunnan, the latter struggles with a delicate balance between political 
orders from Beijing and local economic development. Local authorities in Dehong, for 
instance, endeavor to turn the prefecture into a major center of agricultural product 
distribution linking fruits, beans, and sugarcanes grown in Shan and Kachin states with 
the whole Chinese market. The opium substitution program provides much-needed 
preferential policy conditions, authorized by the central government, to make this 
geoeconomic goal possible.  
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Once the tension becomes implacable and local economic interests damage 
national security concerns, however, the national concern takes precedence. This can be 
seen in the Kokang incident in 2009 when Burmese armies attacked Kokang-based ethnic 
military forces and led to the temporary suspension of transnational agribusiness. Many 
local cadres in Yunnan were consequently sacked and imprisoned. It is therefore clear 
that the geoeconomic strategy to nurture transnational agribusiness between Yunnan and 
northern Myanmar must strongly align with two interrelated geopolitical calculations: 
narcotics control and border security. When the geopolitical goals are jeopardized, the 
central government in Beijing has exhibited no restraint in intervening to reshuffle the 
geoeconomic arrangement and even impose personnel discipline. Nevertheless, the 
central government has to rely on local authorizes to monitor and manage the opium 
substitution program. The following section analyzes how this subnational system of 
control is implemented in Yunnan. 
 
Localized regulatory control over transnational agribusiness 
 
Accompanying the national government’s attempt at geoeconomic integration is a 
localized system of control and regulation. This system entails two major aspects: 
subsidy regulation and import quota control.  
 
Subsidy regulation 
 
For Yunnanese firms, the first step to participate in the opium substitution program is to 
invest in rentable land in northern Myanmar. Then the firms submit project feasibility 
reports, land rent contracts, and a map with GPS data of the plantation area to the local 
bureau of commerce where they register in order to apply for special public funding for 
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opium substitution. Once the commerce bureau approves their application, the firms 
create a special bank account to receive public subsidies from the local bureau of finance. 
Meanwhile, these firms arrange for a special accountant to manage this account by 
submitting annual financial reports to the commerce bureau. The money from the finance 
bureau can be used to cover the costs in northern Myanmar, including transporting 
economic crops from farmland to border ports, building social welfare projects, providing 
allowance to Chinese technicians, and other costs. After disbursement, the commerce 
bureau continues to track and supervise how the funding is used. A firm can be punished 
following any detection of funding misuse by the bureau. Furthermore, firms are 
allocated funding annually rather than given a lump sum up front to ensure the attainment 
of annual plantation goals. Miss Chen, a financial manager in a Banna-based firm, 
explains: 
 
As far as I knew, our boss just wanted to receive free money from the 
government. It [the opium substitution program] was driven by the government 
and seemed to be a profitable business. It went sour because the commerce 
bureau in Banna carefully kept track of the project. Our firm had to update 
information about the use of funding as well as the project in Mongla [in 
northern Myanmar].  
 
This information on enforced reporting was validated through a cross reference to 
comment by Huang (a commerce official in Banna) that “a firm cannot cancel the special 
bank account or withdraw from the program before it completes the project it promised.” 
Reciprocity in this instance is therefore obligatory, as discussed previously in section 2. 
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Meanwhile, the opium substitution program stipulates that financial support should 
be used partly for social welfare projects in the plantation areas in northern Myanmar.4 
Firms are required to do these projects as long as they accept the Chinese state’s public 
subsidy. One firm manager in Banna explains:  
 
The subsidy is very limited and our firm has to use our own money for social 
welfare projects. First of all, we need to build roads in villages. In the past, no 
one built roads in these villages and now they have some, only after we started 
investing in sugarcane plantation. In addition, we help them to build primary 
schools. We also spend money on building community centers. 
 
This use of public and private funding for social welfare projects is a strategy used by the 
Chinese state to push Yunnanese firms to establish local social networks in the villages 
where they operate their agribusiness. Over 80 percent of manager respondents indicate 
that firms generally conformed to regulations upon receiving a public subsidy, an 
outcome which corresponds with what Amsden (1989: 94) terms a “monitored system of 
controls on subsidies.”  
 
Import quota control 
 
In order to regulate zero-tariff imports, the bureaus of commerce in Yunnan’s six border 
prefectures (Pu’er, Banna, Lincang, Baoshang, Dehong, and Nujiang) have been working 
with local Customs branches to establish a quota system. Around 40 crops have been 
placed in the system, and sugarcane and rubber are two main crops. Yunnanese firms 
                                                        
4 One manager notes that public subsidy for social welfare projects is around 350 
yuan per mu (0.16 acre).  
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must report and validate their plantations in northern Myanmar in order to receive zero-
tariff import quotas every year. If the quota runs out, a firm must go through cross-border 
petty trade by paying a tariff of around 3.89%, or through other forms of customs 
clearance. Semi-manufactured agricultural products will be charged much higher tariffs. 
When asked why they did not build sugar mills in northern Myanmar, for instance, the 
respondents from sugar firms explained that Chinese Customs treated semi-manufactured 
sugar as an industrial product instead of raw material. They therefore have to pay 
between 16% to 25% in tariff and other taxes for refined sugar from northern Myanmar.  
 
This high tariff is similarly applied to semi-processed rubber products. The quota 
system ensures that approved economic crops can be treated as domestic raw materials in 
the Chinese market, and allows the Chinese state to effectively regulate the import of 
manufactured goods. The high bar against semi-manufactured agricultural products can 
protect workers in Yunnan’s sugar mills and other processing plants from external shocks 
and thus safeguard their livelihood. Herein lies a potential source of conflict between the 
geopolitical logic of border control and the geoeconomic logic of capital accumulation. 
Indeed, the global movements of agricultural commodities are subject to the 
territorialized order of receiving societies, as shown in the cases of tomatoes between 
Mexico and the U.S. (Berndt and Boeckler, 2011; Berndt, 2013) and tobacco leaves 
between Brazil and Paraguay (Dorfman et al., 2017). In this case study, the Chinese 
border becomes accessible and sealed off at the same time. The process of ordering and 
bordering imposes selective force upon the inflows of economic crops produced in Shan 
and Kachin states in northern Myanmar and thus gives rise to a complex amalgam of 
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manifold and often deeply unequal practices between the Chinese state agencies and 
firms.  
 
Field research indicates the success of import quota control on shaping and 
regulating Yunnanese investors’ agribusiness in northern Myanmar. The goal, as one 
commerce official in Banna commented, “is to promote the opium substitution program 
and protect the Chinese agricultural market as well.” This quota-related protection clearly 
aims to control the inflow of economic crops made in northern Myanmar to China so as 
to maintain the interests of Chinese farmers. Import quota control becomes a nonmarket 
mode of integration built upon reciprocal control, and creates what Amsden (1989: 94) 
calls “a condition for domestic protection.” The continuum of political control upon 
Yunnanese firms’ decision making varies from subsidy inspection to quota approval. Any 
progress along this continuum is contingent on the coordination between these firms and 
local bureaus of commerce in Yunnan.  
 
Meanwhile, the commerce bureaus also contract independent investigation teams 
from universities and research institutes to use remote sensing data and on-the-ground 
visits to check whether firms provide accurate data of crop plantation, including crop 
types and output, plantation area and location, and land contract agreements. One 
commercial official from Dehong emphasizes, “we have the necessary data to know how 
much firms earn from transnational agribusiness.” Through this regulation system, state 
agencies want to supervise firms’ participation in the opium substitution program and 
ensure that they comply with regulations. Nevertheless, this control is only possible due 
to the Chinese state’s efforts to impose territorial control upon the accessibility to 
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financial resources and the Chinese market. State control is integral to the geoeconomic 
expansion of Chinese capital, but as be discussed in the following section, this control 
can engender ‘strategic disobedience’ on the part of firms (ref. section 2).  
 
In the China-Myanmar border region, the Chinese state instituted reciprocal 
control to align the economic interest of Yunnanese agricultural firms with its antidrug 
strategy in northern Myanmar. The two main control policies highlighted in this section 
constitute the regulatory framework for transnational agribusiness. In this sense, 
reciprocal control is a mode of development that in certain ways has enabled the Chinese 
state to subsume market actors (Yunnanese firms and workers) to its geopolitical 
objectives. It would be interesting, then, to explore how firms react to–or, more 
specifically, reciprocate—this institutional arrangement.  
 
 
Firms’ responses to institutionalization 
 
If Yunnanese firms are indeed important to China’s transnational narcotics control in 
northern Myanmar, it would then be necessary for research to move beyond the 
abstraction of state-led geoeconomic integration to examine and evaluate actual economic 
activities on the ground. Indeed, these firms are not passive respondents of state 
regulations. Rather, they actively deploy the tactics of collaboration and evasion to 
reduce business risks and increase economic returns.  
 
Collaboration with state agencies 
 
Generally, firm managers highlight the importance of a positive collaborative relationship 
with state agencies, and particularly local departments of commerce. They do not deny 
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the fact that they benefit from good relationships with commerce officials, including 
higher import quotas, necessary intelligence reports, and preferential loans from 
commercial banks (Amsden 2001). As Mr. Liu (one sugar mill manager) explains,  
 
For our agricultural investment in northern Myanmar, we rely on the commerce 
department for sure. All of our application materials and projects go through the 
commerce bureau in Dehong. The officials also fully support our agribusiness, 
particularly through financial support. Furthermore, we timely report to the 
commerce bureau the issues we encounter, such as smuggling and tariff 
reduction. They will collaborate with other agencies such as border security, 
customs administration, and foreign affairs to address these issues. The 
commerce bureau always gets involved in our transnational agribusiness. If 
there is something wrong, they have to take some responsibility. (Interview in 
Dehong, July 2016) 
 
Mr. Liu highlights how his transnational agribusiness is built upon shared interests 
between his firm and local state agencies in Dehong. A typical response among manager 
interviewees points to the need to maintain a good relationship with local officials in 
Yunnan’s border prefectures. They highlight political support from state agencies, as all 
interviewees have joined local commerce officials to discuss agricultural investments 
with ruling elites in northern Myanmar. Like Mr. Liu, other interviewees appreciate the 
actions taken by local state agencies in Yunnan to handle the difficulties they face in their 
transnational agribusiness. Here, these managers enjoy business-friendly conditions that 
 28
nourish their agricultural investments and reap economic returns. Against this pro-
business context the Chinese state’s geopolitical objective is met.   
 
Apart from political support, information sharing allows firms to reduce losses 
within a highly unstable geopolitical context. Specifically, military conflicts are 
commonplace in the border region on the Myanmar side. In August 2009, Burmese 
armies attacked the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(MNDAA) in response to the MNDAA’s alleged involvement in drug trade. Since 
November 2016, conflicts between Burmese armies and military groups such as the 
Kachin Independent Army, the MNDAA, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army have 
already resulted in hundreds of casualties.  In these harsh conditions, advanced warning is 
necessary. Ms Wu, a business owner of cross-border trade enterprises in Yunnan, had this 
conversation with the authors (Interview in Dehong, July 2016):  
 
Ms Wu: Safety is very important. Once officials receive intelligence about 
imminent conflicts in northern Myanmar, they immediately inform us and ask 
us not to dispatch staff members to potential war zones. We cannot shape 
domestic affairs in northern Myanmar, but we try to avoid personnel loss with 
the help of our government.  
 
Authors: How about the investment? 
 
Ms Wu: You cannot think about that too much. Personal safety is more 
important than money, right? After all, we hire local people we trust to look 
after the field and reduce losses.  
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Indeed, after the Kokang incident in August 2009, the Chinese state changed the 
strategy of opium substitution. As one official from Dehong Department of Public 
Security emphasizes, “safety is the priority.” Considering the high risk in agricultural 
investment in potential war zones in northern Myanmar, the Chinese state attempted to 
reduce the scope of the plantation area on the one hand, and regulate capital outflows and 
crop inflows on the other. This swift action demonstrated reciprocity on the part of the 
state and highlights how private firms increasingly become valued as strategic political-
economic partners. While the scale of state involvement is confined to this border region, 
the collaborative dynamics underscore the significance of state power to ensure the 
implementation of geoeconomic strategies abroad.  
 
Resistance and evasion 
 
The Chinese state’s ongoing efforts to entwine transnational agriculture in Yunnan with 
security objectives are often met (a) with firms’ tactics of resistance against state 
regulations and (b) with collusion between local cadres and entrepreneurs. While this 
phenomenon is not unique to China and across East Asia, its occurrence has not been 
documented as a dynamic aspect of the geopolitics-geoeconomics relationship. Indeed, 
even Amsden’s studies on reciprocal control in South Korea and Taiwan have not 
foregrounded empirical evidence of resistance and evasion as potential disruptions to 
reciprocity. We advance this point by demonstrating how the desire of embezzlement 
cannot be easily prohibited despite a monitoring system to ensure the appropriate use of 
pubic funding to support opium substitution projects. Ms Qian, a former manager in 
Banna, says: 
 30
 
I saw many cases of embezzlement in the past despite the government’s strict 
supervision. Our company was not well organized and, frankly speaking, our 
boss hoped to grab money from the government. 
 
When asked whether their firms take advantage of the opium substitution program 
to misuse public money, our respondents normally denied any allegation, but indicated 
that some other firms probably engaged in financial fraud. Still, the misuse of public 
subsidy is not common, partly because the amount distributed to firms is relatively 
limited, and partly because misconduct could receive severe punishment from local 
commerce bureaus. Rather, firm managers complain that the public subsidy is not enough 
to cover the costs of social welfare projects or remedy their loss due to uncontrollable 
factors such as military conflict and trafficking. For instance, Ms Wu in Dehong points 
out that her firm suffered a loss of over 10 million yuan (~US$1.58 million) because the 
price of sugarcane smuggled into Yunnan was lower than the price her firm paid growers 
in northern Myanmar. She complains, “If the government cannot stop the smuggling, our 
loss will continue. Of course, the government does not cover our losses.” This is an 
important finding as it demonstrates a distinct separation of the economic from the 
political.  
 
The public subsidy “pie” is so small that firms find no need to overtly resist the 
state. The lucrative business comes from the import of economic crops from Myanmar 
into Yunnan and the simultaneous ability to take advantage of various customs regulatory 
frameworks to avoid tariffs. A clear indicator of the relevance of geopolitical control, the 
quota system enables the Chinese state to determine the import of economic crops from 
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northern Myanmar. Various fissures are created when the policy is implemented on the 
ground, however. As respondents from sugar mills in Banna and Dehong explain, the 
output of sugarcane production in Shan and Kachin states in northern Myanmar can reach 
1.8 million tons per year, but the total quota for zero-tariff sugarcane import through the 
opium substitution program is around 1.4 million tons. Apart from around 10 percent of 
sugarcane that is refined into sugar and then trafficked into China, around 85% of 
northern Myanmar’s sugarcane enters the Chinese market via the quota system, cross-
border petty trade (3.89% tariff), regular trade (9-10% tariff), and smuggling. Like 
sugarcane, other economic crops such as rice, corn, and banana are smuggled into 
Yunnan through the porous border between Yunnan and Myanmar. For instance, the 
Ruili river, a natural border that separates Ruili in Yunnan and Muse in northern 
Myanmar, is lined with numerous informal ports to smuggle commodities. The villages 
along the river on the Myanmar side contain cargo stations for trucks, mainly registered 
in Ruili, to load and unload agricultural crops and manufactured goods.  
 
Apart from smuggling, another tactic is to trade quotas for economic return. For 
instance, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Banna still received import quotas from the 
Banna Department of Commerce after it went bankrupt. With no way to actually use up 
these quotas to import rubber latex, the shell company hired an accountant to sell its 
quotas to private firms. These private firms used the quotas to import rubber latex on 
behalf of the shell quota owner. As one rubber firm manager in Banna asserts, “Selling 
quotas became a lucrative business for the firm and a lot of people benefited from it.” 
The fissure in state regulations allows entrepreneurs to earn more money, though the 
trade on import quotas is illegal.  
 32
 
Finally, entrepreneurs can take the opportunity to build strong “friendship” with 
local officials, particularly customs officials, through commissions and bribery. One 
private firm based in Banna participated in the opium substitution program around 2006 
and became a leader in rubber latex import. Laoding, the boss of this firm, invested 
substantial funds to foster good connections with officials in the local customs 
administration. Maggie, a financial manager who formerly worked for Laoding, reports 
what she saw: 
 
One day, the supervision division in the local customs administration called my 
colleague working in the public relations office. Then my colleague went out. I 
asked him why? He said he needed to pay a bill in a seafood restaurant where a 
customs official’s wife was having dinner. My boss arranged for people in the 
public relations office to do this sort of job. How smart he is! If cross-border 
trade is a piece of cake, you cannot eat it exclusively. More often than not, other 
people take the majority, but you still have some to eat. If you cannot figure out 
how to share the benefits, there is no way for you to make any profit. My boss 
definitely understands the game. (Interview in Banna, July 2016) 
 
During the firm’s heyday, Laoding gained enormous wealth from importing, legally and 
illegally, hundreds of thousands of tons of rubber latex from Myanmar and Thailand. 
When some corrupted customs officers in Banna were convicted and sentenced to 
imprisonment in 2009, Laoding was also arrested for bribery and smuggling. The vacuum 
left by Laoding was soon filled up by other audacious managers who wanted to quickly 
profit from transnational agribusiness between Yunnan and Myanmar. Profit sharing 
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between firms and customs officials, albeit informally and illegally, sheds light on how 
firms deploy tactics to evade state regulations in collusion with corrupted cadres, though 
these entrepreneurs do not aim to fulfill geopolitical goals (which, for that matter, could 
also include the expansion of geoeconomic influence). 
 
Indeed, far from seeing the Chinese state’s reciprocal control over their businesses, 
manager interviewees viewed it more instrumentally as an opportunity to build 
partnerships with state agencies for transnational agribusiness. Hence, their reaction to 
reciprocal control is quite pragmatic. On the one hand, these entrepreneurs rely on the 
Chinese state’s political and financial support to ensure the safety of their investments in 
northern Myanmar and the import of economic crops into Yunnan. On the other hand, 
they endeavor to evade state regulations so that they can gain more economic returns. 
While these firms can instrumentally use the Chinese state’s antinarcotics programs as an 
opportunity to open up new spaces of capital accumulation, they also are subject to state 
control. From the firms’ standpoint, the success of reciprocal control in Yunnan is 
contingent on the relative strength of collaboration and evasion in order to make 
agribusiness profitable, though antinarcotics security initiatives remain important. As our 
respondents always indicate, they may not actively participate in opium substitution in 
northern Myanmar if it is unprofitable.  
 
While Amsden (2001) emphasizes that the state allocates subsidies to make 
manufacturing and other economic activities profitable, she does not go further to explore 
how firms can resist against or evade state control when profit margins are endangered. 
Congealed into transnational agribusiness between Yunnan and northern Myanmar are 
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entrepreneurs’ practices of profit making under a certain set of social and political rules. 
Their localized networks in the border region allow them to operate transnational 
agribusiness better than other firms, but their economic activities had to be (self-) 
contained within the regulatory framework created by the Chinese state. Reflecting on 
China’s opium substitution program, Tom Kramar, an analyst at the Amsterdam-based 
Transnational Institute (TNI), argues that “From TNI’s perspective, the development 
model of China is not development. It’s business as usual” (Time, 19 December 2013). 
Kramar further contends that “China’s opium substitution policy should not continue in 
its present form” (Time 19 December 2013). While this critique spells out the working of 
China-led capital accumulation and narcotics control, it treats the policy as a black box 
without delving into the delicate power relations between the Chinese state and private 
agricultural firms and how the policy gets entangled with geopolitics and geoeconomics. 
On the surface, it is business as usual, but when probed further, it is not an outcome of 
the abstract laws of China’s capital expansion into northern Myanmar. Rather, it 
encompasses a geopolitically driven and institutionally differentiated spatial strategy to 
overcome the Chinese state’s sovereign limit towards an experimentation with 
transnational narcotics control.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has analyzed how the enactment of reciprocal control institutionalizes 
transnational agribusiness between Yunnan and northern Myanmar and shapes the state-
firm relationship. The geoeconomic logic of transnational agribusiness has been 
integrated into the Chinese state’s concern with drug-oriented national security 
challenges, indicating the increasing significance of nonstate and private actors in 
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national security strategies (Cowen and Smith, 2009). Two expressions of integration are 
presented. First, state agencies in the central government in Beijing provide public 
funding to subsidize Yunnanese firms and collaborate with their counterparts in 
Southeast Asia to clear political hurdles for the opium substitution program. Second, 
subnational state agencies in Yunnan take responsibility for implementing reciprocal 
policies made by the central government and monitor firms’ transnational agribusiness 
through subsidy regulation and import quotas. The administrative division of reciprocal 
control aims to overcome the sovereign limits of the Chinese state—in terms of border 
control and political sensitivity—for transnational narcotics control.  
 
Relative to the state-firm relations for geoeconomic engagement as identified by 
Luttwak (see section 2), the institution of reciprocal control in Yunnan represents a move 
away from top down, administratively oriented planning to a dynamic engagement with 
market actors. The emphasis on reciprocity, rather than absolute disciplinary control, 
augments the status of market actors in the security regime. This situation was not seen 
during the Mao era and is still highly uneven across China, given the Chinese state’s 
ideological distrust of private capital accumulation. Reciprocal control thereby 
demonstrates the expansion of geoeconomic influence as a means of securitization. To 
reduce the flows of illicit drugs into China, the promotion of transnational agribusiness in 
targeted areas in northern Myanmar became a state spatial strategy. The development and 
regulation of this specific agribusiness reflects how market logics have permeated 
geopolitical calculations within senior policymaking circles in China.  
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Finally, the analysis demonstrates a mixture of state authority and market logic at 
work, albeit with compromise and resistance, with critical implications for research into 
China’s growing geoeconomic influence. This analysis of reciprocal control contains the 
potential for analyzing the state-firm nexus as the constituent entity of a globalizing 
China and as a platform for investigating localized ways of pursuing geopolitical and 
geoeconomic goals (Lim, 2010; Norris, 2016). Gonzalez-Vicente (2011) argues that the 
operation of Chinese SOEs overseas is an extension of the Chinese state’s strategic 
branches. This extension is not built upon a neoliberal policy of privatization and 
deregulation, but on marketization and profitability. The alliance between Chinese state 
agencies and Chinese SOEs, together with local business partners and a group of 
cosmopolitan professional managers, gives rise to what Gonzalez-Vicente (2011: 409) 
calls “the porosity of state/society boundaries.” This sort of porosity similarly happens to 
state agencies and private firms in transnational agribusiness between Yunnan and 
northern Myanmar. Indeed, China’s global expansion builds upon the Chinese state’s 
regular reconfiguration of domestic economic-geographical formations as Chinese 
enterprises’ active involvement in the global economy (Lim, 2014). For this reason, Alice 
Amsden’s work on reciprocal control is so valuable, showing the entwinement of 
reciprocity within the geopolitical-geoeconomic dynamic. 
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Figure 1 
 
